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In June 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a 
recommendation urging the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to “develop 
guidance, based on empirical and scientific evidence, for operators to establish 
fatigue management systems, including information about the content and 
implementation of these systems” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2008, p. 
10). The NTSB stated that it took this step based on “longstanding concerns about 
human fatigue causing or contributing to aviation accidents and/or incidents” 
(NTSB, 2008, p. 3) and the inadequacy of existing regulation at mitigating fatigue 
risks in aviation.  
 
The Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA] (2008a), a large U.S. and Canadian 
pilot union, commended NTSB for its work in the area of airline pilot fatigue, 
signaling that unions are concerned that pilot fatigue poses a risk to safety in 
aviation. The organization highlighted that any solution to combat pilot fatigue 
would have to be successfully included in corporate cultures and corporate fatigue 
risk management systems (Air Line Pilots Association, 2008a). 
 
The safety risk of pilot fatigue became more apparent after two recent major 
aviation accidents. Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on February 12, 2009, about 
2217 Eastern Standard Time (EST). While the NTSB did not identify fatigue as a 
contributing factor to the accident, recommendations were made in the final 
accident report to improve the fatigue risk management system (FRMS) in place at 
Colgan Air (NTSB, 2010). UPS flight 1354 crashed on August 14, 2013, about 
0447 Central Daylight Time (CDT). NTSB (2014) found that both the captain’s and 
first-officer's flight performance was impaired due to fatigue and circadian factors.  
 
In 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made changes to the 
previous rest requirements in the form of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 
117 (Part 117) for passenger operations to address fatigue-related risks factors for 
airline pilots. The rule became effective as of January 2014 (“Flightcrew Member 
Duty,” 2012). The rest requirements found in Part 117 are applicable to all 
certificate holders operating under 14 CFR Part 121 (Part 121), which includes most 
passenger airline pilots in the United States. As of January 2015, cargo carrier 
carriers operating under Part 121 are exempt from Part 117.  
 
Problem Statement 
 This study explores the perceptions of self-identified FAA-certified pilots 
on effects of Part 117 on safety, alertness and fatigue three months after the rule 
became effective. It is widely accepted that shared beliefs and perceptions are 
linked to safety culture (Cooper, 2000). The researchers regard pilot perceptions of 
Part 117 and its elements as an important indication of the adequacy and success of 
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the crew rest requirements. Using a Likert-scale survey, self-identified pilots 
certified by the FAA were asked about the perceived impact of the crew rest 
requirements on overall safety, including the ability to operate the aircraft safely 
and adapt to an adequate sleep cycle, as well as alertness and fatigue level. 
The researchers decided to include a question to determine whether pilots 
were in favor of including cargo pilots in Part 117 specifically to establish how the 
pilot community perceived this exclusion. This question was included in response 
to a press release by the union representing UPS pilots calling for an end of the Part 
117 exception for cargo carriers (Independent Pilots Association, 2014). 
 
Literature Review 
The purpose of this literature review was to define fatigue and its impact on 
safety in aviation, discuss the development and scope of the crew rest regulations, 
and provide an overview of prior studies on pilot fatigue perception in aviation. 
Defining Fatigue and its Impact on Safety in Aviation 
Most people have experienced fatigue in their lives at home, work, or 
school. Fatigue may generally be defined as a reduction in the ability to complete 
work, and may occur due to physically or mentally demanding tasks.  
 
Caldwell (2005) stated that commercial airline pilots are “constantly 
confronted with long duty days, early departures, late arrival, and non-standard 
work hours that include night duty and rotating schedules” (p. 88) and found that 
these factors could result in sleep loss, which may contribute to fatigue. Pilot fatigue 
is a well-recognized concern in the airline industry. The European Cockpit 
Association (2012) reported that 85% of pilots surveyed in Austria and Denmark 
indicated operating aircraft while being too fatigued. A survey of Portuguese airline 
pilots found that 91.4% of participants revealed having made errors in the cockpit 
due to fatigue (Reis, Mestre, & Canhão, 2013). 
 
There are many definitions of fatigue. In the context of aviation, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] (2013) defines fatigue as:  
 
A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability 
resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or 
workload (mental and/or physical activity) that can impair a crew member’s 
alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-related 
duties (p. 2). 
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ICAO’s definition of fatigue emphasized important factors that affect a 
pilot’s ability to safely operate an aircraft, such as extended wakefulness, workload, 
and circadian phases. The FAA (2009) described fatigue and its impact on safety 
as “a condition characterized by increased discomfort with lessened capacity for 
work, reduced efficiency of accomplishment, loss of power or capacity to respond 
to stimulation, and is usually accompanied by a feeling of weariness and tiredness” 
(p. 2). Increased discomfort is a perception or feeling. Therefore, perception of 
fatigue is part of measuring fatigue. 
 
There is no universal answer to how fatigue can be avoided, but Konz 
(1990) suggested that “Fatigue is reduced by (1) preventing it in the first place, and 
(2) curing it with rest,” (p. 293) two principles that are evident in the Part 117 crew 
rest requirements. 
 
Pilot associations in Europe and North America (European Cockpit 
Association, 2012) have identified pilot fatigue as a major safety issue for their 
members. ALPA (2008a) has long worked on lobbying and advocating for 
improved crew rest requirements to mitigate the impact of fatigue on pilot 
performance. In 2008, ALPA stated that “The flight and duty rules and regulation 
in the United States and Canada are archaic, were written decades ago and were 
based on aircraft types and operations that were in existence then.” (p. iii), urging 
regulators to act. 
 
Previous Studies on Pilot Fatigue Perception in Aviation 
Co, Gregory, Johnson and Rosekind (1999) found that regional airline pilots 
identified long duty days, multiple flight legs, and short rest periods as factors 
contributing to fatigue. Bourgeois-Bourgrine, Cabon, Gounelle, Mollard and 
Coblentz (2003) found in a survey of 739 airline pilots that both long-haul and 
short-haul pilots perceived sleep loss as principal factor for fatigue. 
Development and Scope of Crew Rest Regulations 
Managing human fatigue has been an item on NTSB’s “Most Wanted” list 
since its first publication in 1990 (U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT], 
2009). In June 2008, the NTSB issued a recommendation urging the FAA to 
“develop guidance…for operators to establish fatigue management systems” (p. 
10). 
 
In 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) announced an audit of FAA 
regulations and airline policies in regard to crew rest requirements (DOT, 2009). In 
2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration 
Extension Act of 2010, which is also known as the 1,500-hour rule. The act 
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contained provisions about pilot fatigue in Section 212. In this section, Congress 
urged the FAA to “issue regulations . . . to specify limitation on the hours of flight 
and duty time” (p. 2362) considering factors such as time of day, number of takeoffs 
and landings, number of time zones crossed as well as research on fatigue (Airline 
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010). The act also 
contained provisions requiring Part 121 carriers to submit Fatigue Risk 
Management Plans to the FAA. 
 
The FAA accelerated its work on crew rest requirements and issued a notice 
for proposed rulemaking in 2010 (FAA, 2010). The final rule was published in the 
Federal Register on January 4, 2012. It became effective two years later on January 
4, 2014 (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
 
Part 117 consists of thirteen sections related to crew rest that are shown in 
Table 1. The elements of the regulations included fitness for duty requirements, the 
introduction of required Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) for airlines, 
flight time limitations, the introduction of flight duty periods, cumulative flight 
time and flight duty period limits, and required rest periods (“Flightcrew Member 
Duty,” 2012). The following section explains six major sections contained in Part 
117. 
 
Fitness for Duty. The fitness for duty requirements introduced in Part 117 instruct 
individual flight crew members to affirm that they are prepared and rested enough 
to perform their duty (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
Fatigue Risk Management System. The definition of a FRMS is “the planning 
and control of the working environment, in order to minimize, as far as is 
reasonably practicable, the adverse effects of fatigue on workforce alertness and 
performance” (Gander et al., 2011, p. 574). Gander et al. (2011) also determined 
that comprehensive FRMS include both fatigue prevention and fatigue mitigation 
strategies. Under Part 117, airlines need to establish a FRMS to better manage 
fatigue-related risk factors (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
Flight Time Limitations. In Part 117, the FAA defined limits for maximum flight 
time. For 2-pilot crews, a pilot cannot be scheduled to fly more than 8 hours 
between midnight to 5am, 9 hours between 5 am and 7:59 pm, and 8 hours between 
8 pm and midnight. Flight time limits of 13 hours and 17 hours apply for 3-pilot 
and 4-pilot crews respectively (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
Flight Duty Periods. The FAA defined limits for flight duty period durations 
ranging between 9 and 14 hours based on time of start and number of flight 
segments flown (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).  
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Table 1 
Elements of Part 117 Contained in the Federal Register 
Section Description 
§ 117.5 Fitness for duty Flightcrew members need to affirmatively state that he or she is fit for duty, defined as rested 
and prepared to perform his or her duties 
§ 117.7 Fatigue risk management system Airlines must have a FRMS or equivalent system in place, which must include pre-defined 
components 
§ 117.7 Fatigue education and awareness 
training program 
Airlines must develop and implement a fatigue education and awareness training program for 
crewmembers, crew schedulers, operations managers and personnel overseeing operations or 
scheduling 
§ 117.11 Flight time limitation The FAA specified time limits for flight duty periods, depending on number of flightcrew 
members present in the cockpit, time of report and number of segments 
§ 117.13 — Flight duty period: 
Unaugmented operations 
In addition to flight duty period limitations, the FAA introduced the term “unaugmented 
operations”, under which the flight duty period is based on local time at the theater in which the 
flightcrew member was last acclimated. The maximum flight duty period is reduced by 30 
minutes for unaugmented operations. 
§ 117.15 Flight duty period: Split duty Under certain conditions and for unaugmented operations only, if a flightcrew member is 
provided with a rest opportunity (an opportunity to sleep) in a suitable accommodation during 
his or her flight duty period, the time that the flightcrew member spends in the suitable 
accommodation is not part of that flightcrew member's flight duty period 
§ 117.17 Flight duty period: Augmented 
flightcrew 
For flight operations conducted with an acclimated augmented flightcrew, no certificate holder 
may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the scheduled flight duty 
period will exceed specified limits 
§ 117.19 Flight duty period extension Under unforeseen operational circumstances, flight duty period extensions of up to 2 hours may 
apply 
§ 117.21 Reserve status The FAA defined time limits for flightcrew member reserve status 
§ 117.23 Cumulative limitation Flightcrew member's total flight time cannot exceed: (1) 100 hours in any 672 consecutive 
hours or (2) 1,000 hours in any 365 consecutive calendar day period. Flightcrew member's total 
Flight Duty Period cannot exceed: (1) 60 flight duty period hours in any 168 consecutive hours 
or (2) 190 flight duty period hours in any 672 consecutive hours. 
§ 117.25 Rest period Before beginning any reserve or duty period a flightcrew member must be given at least 30 
consecutive hours free from all duty within the past 168 consecutive hour period. If the 
flightcrew member travels more than 60 degrees longitude or is away for more than 158 
consecutive hours, a rest period of 56 hours or three physiological nights’ rest must be provided. 
Flightcrew members rest time can be reduced to 10 hours with 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep 
opportunity if travel is within 60 degrees of longitude and cumulative limitations are not 
exceeded. 
§ 117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations A certificate holder may schedule and a flightcrew member may accept up to five consecutive 
flight duty periods that infringe on the window of circadian low if the certificate holder provides 
the flightcrew member with an opportunity to rest in a suitable accommodation during each of 
the consecutive nighttime flight duty periods. 
§ 117.29 Emergency and government 
sponsored operations 
Special regulations exist for emergency and government sponsored operations 
Note. From “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements” 77 Fed. Reg. 329 
(January 4, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 117, 119, 121) 
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Cumulative Flight Time and Flight Duty Period Limits. No pilot is permitted to 
fly more than 100 hours in any 627 consecutive hour period or 1,000 hours in any 
consecutive 365 calendar day period. Additionally, the total cumulative flight duty 
period cannot exceed 60 hours in any 168 consecutive hour time period or 190 flight 
duty hours in any 672 consecutive hour period (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
Required Rest Periods. Pilots must have a rest period of at least 30 consecutive 
hours within the past 168 consecutive hour period. Part 117 also contains provisions 
for travel exceeding 60 degrees of longitude, in which case an extended 56-hour 
rest period “encompassing three physiological nights’ rest” must be provided. If no 
travel exceeding 60 degrees of longitude takes place, a rest period of 10 hours 
including 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity must be provided prior to any 
duty period (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012). 
Method 
 An online survey was sent to subscribers of the Flight Safety Information 
Newsletter, maintained by Curt Lewis and Associates LLC. This newsletter was 
selected primarily due to its large number of subscribers who are pilots. Over a 
period of three weeks in March and April 2014, 132 self-identified pilots 
participated in the study. For the analysis, 92 respondents completed all survey 
questions and, therefore, were selected to be included in the study. 
 
Of these 92 pilots, 88 identified as male and 4 as female. When asked about 
their highest level of pilot certification, 89 respondents indicated having a FAA Air 
Transport Pilot Certificate; one participant indicated having a FAA Commercial 
certificate; and two participants chose “Other.” For type of operations flown, 68% 
of participants indicated that they fly under Part 121 Passenger Service, 17% under 
Part 91, 12% under Part 121 Cargo Service, and 3% under Part 135, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Prior to the main survey questions, participants were asked to rate their 
knowledge of the changes contained in Part 117 ranging from “I have not heard 
about it” to “I have heard about it and I am very familiar with it.” Five participants 
who chose “I have not heard about it” were directed to the end of the survey and 
thanked for their participation. 
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Figure 1. Type of operations flown by survey participants 
 
Table 2 shows the questions contained in the survey. The first question 
contained five sub-items. Participants were asked to choose answers on a scale 
ranging from 1 – strongly negative to 5 – strongly positive. The second question 
asked participants if they thought that cargo operations should be included in the 
crew rest regulations. Participants were asked to choose answers on a scale ranging 
from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. The third question asked for 
comments on the crew rest regulations. 
Table 2 
Representation of Survey Structure and Survey Questions 
# Question Item Type of Answer 
1 Please indicate how you feel 
the following items have been 
impacted on a personal level by 
the new regulations in 14 
C.F.R. Part 117 
Overall Safety Likert-scale:  
1 – strongly negative to  
5 – strongly positive Ability for pilots to operate the aircraft 
safely 
Overall pilot alertness 
Ability for pilots to adapt to an adequate 
sleep cycle 
Overall pilot fatigue level 
2 Do you think that Cargo 
Operations should be included 
in 14 C.F.R Part 117? 
 Likert-scale: 
1 – strongly disagree to  
5 – strongly agree 
3 Do you have any additional 
comments regarding how the 
new regulations in 14 C.F.R. 
Part 117 will affect you 
personally? 
 Open-ended 
68%
17%
12%
3%
Part 121 Passenger
Service
Part 91
Part 121 Cargo
Service
Part 135
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The survey questions were developed by the researchers, then revised with 
the help of an expert panel to assure face validity. The expert panel consisted of 
three university aviation professors who have Part 121 flight experience as well as 
extensive knowledge of both survey creation and survey methodology.  
The 13 Likert-scale questions contained in sections one through three were 
analyzed for internal consistency with Cronbach’s α, which resulted in a value of α 
= 0.901. A Cronbach’s α of ≥ 0.6 is generally accepted to be robust. For the analysis 
of the 49 open-ended comments, the researchers developed a coding scheme to 
identify recurring themes. The coding process was independently performed by two 
researchers using QSR International’s NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. 
Table 3 shows the ten different codes that were assigned to the open-ended answers. 
The coding results were compared and the agreement rate between the two raters 
was 94%, as provided by the qualitative data analysis software. 
Table 3  
Codes and Definitions Used in Qualitative Analysis of Open-Ended Comments 
Code Description 
Cargo Participant mentioned cargo in comment 
Improve safety Participant mentioned improved safety 
Less fatigued Participant mentioned being less fatigued  
Less rest Participant mentioned getting less rest  
Less safe Participant mentioned being less safe  
Longer flight time Participant mentioned having to fly more  
More fatigued Participant mentioned feeling more fatigued 
Negative Participant mentioned feeling negatively about the new regulations 
Positive Participant mentioned feeling positively about the new regulations 
Split day Participant mentioned the problem of split day and split shift 
 
Results 
 Results from each of the three survey questions are discussed. Once again, 
it is important to mention that the rule became effective in January 2014 and that 
the survey was administered in March and April 2014. 
Perceptions of the Regulations Impact 
The five sub-question in this section were used to measure perceptions of the impact 
Part 117 had on ability to operate the aircraft safely, alertness, ability to adapt to an 
adequate sleep cycle and fatigue level. Table 4 summarizes the results. 
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Pilots perceived that Part 117 impacted safety positively, with 32 (35%) 
respondents choosing “Slightly Positive” and 8 (9%) respondents choosing 
“Strongly Positive.” Sixteen (17%) felt a “Slightly Negative” impact and 11 (12%) 
felt a “Strongly Negative” impact on overall safety at a personal level. Twenty-five 
(27%) of respondents felt no impact on overall safety at a personal level.  
Pilots indicated positive perceptions of the impact on overall level of 
fatigue. Twenty-nine (32%) participants felt a slightly positive impact of Part 117 
on their overall fatigue level and three (3%) participants felt a strongly positive 
impact. Sixteen (17%) participants indicated a slight negative impact on their 
fatigue level and 13 (14%) indicated a strongly negative impact. Thirty-one (33%) 
participants felt no impact of Part 117 on their overall fatigue level. 
Overall, pilot perceptions on these five items were mixed, with many pilots 
indicating that they perceived no positive or negative impact. 
Table 4 
Perceptions of the Regulations’ Impact on Personal Level 
Question Strongly 
Negative 
Slightly 
Negative 
None Slightly 
Positive 
Strongly 
Positive 
Mean SD 
Overall safety 
 
12% 17% 27% 35% 9% 3.11 1.162 
Ability to operate 
the aircraft safely 
 
4% 22% 35% 30% 9% 3.17 1.012 
Overall pilot 
alertness 
 
8% 21% 38% 29% 4% 3.02 0.994 
Ability to adapt to 
an adequate sleep 
cycle 
 
12% 15% 47% 23% 3% 2.90 0.995 
Overall pilot 
fatigue level 
14% 17% 34% 32% 3% 2.92 1.092 
 
Perceptions on Inclusion of Cargo Operators 
 Fifty-seven (62%) participants strongly agreed and 16 (17%) agreed with 
the statement that cargo operators should be included under Part 117, compared to 
seven participants (8%) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. 
Eleven (12%) participants neither agreed or disagreed with the statement. Figure 2 
summarizes the results. 
9
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 Figure 2. Frequency of responses to inclusion of cargo carriers. 
Only 12% of the respondents identified themselves as cargo pilots, while a 
total 79% of the pilots agreed that cargo carriers should be included in Part 117. Of 
the twelve cargo pilots answering the survey, nine strongly agreed and one agreed 
about including cargo pilots in Part 117. One cargo pilot strongly disagreed and one 
cargo pilot answered “neither agree or disagree.”   
Open-Ended Survey Responses 
 Forty-nine (53%) of the 92 participants used the opportunity to provide 
comments about the impact of the regulations on a personal level. The researchers 
analyzed these responses by assigning ten different codes to the comments based 
on topics mentioned. The frequency of each code is shown in Figure 3. As 
mentioned earlier, the coding agreement rate was 94%, which is considered high.  
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 Figure 3. Frequency of codes in comments. 
For the qualitative analysis, common themes were identified. The results 
revealed that generally negative perceptions about the crew rest regulations were 
mentioned eighteen times, and generally positive perceptions nine times. Specific 
comments, both positive and negative, are presented separately under headings 
such as “improve safety” and “longer flight time.” For safety, eight respondents 
indicated “less safe” and three respondents indicated “improve safety.” For fatigue, 
11 respondents indicated “more fatigue,” and one respondent indicated “less 
fatigue.” 
These comments lead to a general impression that the crew rest changes are 
more often viewed negatively than positively among the pilots providing 
comments. It is important to note that specific negative or positive comments such 
as “more fatigued” or “improve safety” are not a subset of general negative or 
positive comments. Individual comments may have had multiple codes assigned. 
Discussion 
Perception of self-identified FAA-certified pilots on effects of Part 117 on 
safety, alertness and fatigue was addressed in the first survey question. The results 
of this first survey question showed that pilots perceived a mixed impact of Part 
117 on safety, alertness and fatigue, with between 27%-47% of pilots picking a 
neutral position. The researchers believe that this high percentage of neutral 
responses may be attributed to the timing of the survey, which was sent out over a 
two-week period in March/April 2014, only months after the rule became effective 
in January 2014. 
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Pilot perceptions on including cargo carriers in the Part 117 regulations 
were asked in the second survey question. The results for this second question 
showed that pilots strongly favor an inclusion of cargo carriers under Part 117, 
indicating that the surveyed pilots had strong opinions about the exclusion of cargo 
pilots. 
The third research question gave participating pilots the opportunity to 
provide open-ended comments. Eighteen out of 49 open-ended comments indicated 
negative reactions to the crew rest requirements, while positive sentiments were 
mentioned nine times. Selected negative comments are discussed in order to 
highlight some of the perceived shortcomings of Part 117. 
Fourteen respondents mentioned that they were now flying more hours 
under Part 117. One pilot stated that “While this [the crew rest regulations] was 
done to combat fatigue, I feel like it has done the opposite in many ways. I can now 
fly up to nine block hours versus eight, depending upon check in time and number 
of legs. I can also routinely fly six days in a row, and I never could do that under 
the previous rules. The cumulative aspects of fatigue are dangerous, but they are 
overlooked completely.” 
Four participants mentioned the problem of split days or split shifts. 
Although the crew rest requirements prescribe a 10-hour rest period, including 8 
hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity between two separate flight duty periods, 
the rest time can be scheduled during any time of day or night (“Flightcrew Member 
Duty,” 2012). Pilots mentioned that scheduling a rest period during day-time did 
not afford them with an adequate rest opportunity between two shifts. In a split shift 
day, pilots may be scheduled to fly two long-haul flights within a 24-hour period. 
To illustrate this split-shift scenario, a hypothetical example was developed and is 
shown in Figure 4. 
The rest period between two separate flight duty periods can be reduced to 
10 hours with 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity if travel does not exceed 
60° of longitude, a reduction from 56 hours or three nights when travel exceeds 60° 
of longitude. In the scenario shown in Figure 4, a pilot is scheduled to fly from the 
East Coast of the U.S. to Brazil for the first flight duty period. After completing the 
first duty period, an airline could hypothetically schedule the same pilot for a trip 
to Europe on the same day of his return, after only 10 hours of rest time that would 
occur during daytime. In this scenario, the split between shifts occurs on day 5 – 
the Split Day. 
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 Figure 4. A hypothetical split-shift scenario 
The opinion that cargo operators should be included in the regulations was 
another recurring theme, explicitly mentioned by four pilots in the open-ended 
comments section. One pilot stated that “When cargo operators were cut out of the 
117 rules, the industry failed to protect the pilots and public on the ground. To not 
be covered by the new 117 rules is a slap in the face and to say my life has no 
value.” 
A second pilot stated that “a hull loss [of a cargo aircraft] into a 
school/freeway (you name it) would be equally disastrous as a passenger aircraft.” 
The analysis of the open-ended comments revealed negative perceptions 
among pilots about the lack of cargo carrier inclusion in the rest requirements and 
the problem of split shifts, where pilots were scheduled to operate two long-haul 
flights within a 24-hour period. 
Limitations 
A caveat of the findings is that the survey was conducted less than four 
months after the effective date of Part 117. It is possible that pilots and airlines had 
not completed their adjustments to accommodate the rule in an operationally 
feasible manner at that point in time. The survey may need to be repeated to 
measure pilot perceptions longitudinally to better understand the effect of Part 117 
on perceived safety and level of fatigue.  
It should also be noted that a response bias may be present as the results of 
this survey may not be representative of the general pilot population. In addition, a 
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known response bias for this of type of survey is that participants with strong 
opinions may be overrepresented, especially in the open-ended comments. 
 
Conclusion 
This study explored the perceptions of self-identified FAA-certified pilots 
on effects of Part 117 on safety, alertness and fatigue within months after the rule 
became effective. Pilots were asked about their perception of including cargo pilots 
under Part 117. 
 Pilot perceptions were mixed on the safety, fatigue and alertness items. 
Responses for many items were slightly positive, but a large percentage of 
respondents were neutral, which the researchers contribute to the relative recent 
effectiveness of Part 117 at the time of survey administration in March/April 2014. 
 Seventy-nine percent of pilots responded that they were very strongly or 
strongly in favor of including cargo pilots under Part 117. This apparent concern 
about the exclusion of cargo carriers in the crew rest regulations was also reflected 
in the open comments, where four pilots explicitly mentioned the issue. 
 This exploratory study into perceptions of self-identified pilots shortly after 
the implementation of these crew rest requirements can serve as a stepping stone 
for future research. Follow-up studies in years after the implementation of Part 117 
and an increased sample size may help to measure pilot perceptions longitudinally. 
It is also hoped that the open-ended comments presented in this study can help 
researchers to develop further research questions based on the issues mentioned by 
pilots. 
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